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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The paper begins with a discussion of Russell’s view that the notion of cause is 
unnecessary for science, and can therefore be eliminated.  It is argued that this is true for 
theoretical physics, but untrue for medicine where the notion of cause plays a central role.  
Medical theories are closely connected with practical action (attempts to cure and prevent 
disease), whereas theoretical physics is more remote from applications.  This suggests the 
view that causal laws are appropriate in a context where there is a close connection to 
action.  This leads to a development of an action-related theory of causality which is 
similar to the agency theory of Menzies and Price, but differs from it in a number of 
respects, one of which is the following.  Menzies and Price connect ‘A causes B’ with an 
action to produce B by instantiating A, but, particularly in the case of medicine, the law 
can also be linked to the action of trying to avoid B by ensuring that A is not instantiated.  
The action-related theory has in common with agency theory of Menzies and Price, the 
ability to explain causal asymmetry in a simple fashion, but the introduction of avoidance 
actions together with some ideas taken form Russell enable some of the objections to 
agency accounts of causality to be met. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to present an action-related theory of causality.  This theory is a 
variant of the agency theory of causality which has been expounded by Peter Menzies 
and Huw Price in an important series of papers (Price [1991], [1992] and Menzies and 
Price [1993]).  Accordingly when developing the action-related theory, I will compare it 
to the agency theory of Menzies and Price, pointing out similarities and differences.  I 
have invented a new name to capture the differences between the two theories, but it 
should be stressed that there are important agreements as well, particularly as regards the 
key issue of explaining the asymmetry of the causal relation.   2
The general approach of relating causality to human action or agency has in fact 
quite a long history.  Menzies and Price mention some earlier writers ([1993], p. 187, 
Footnote 1), and in fact the basic idea is to be found in the following famous quotation 
from Bacon ([1620], III, p. 259): 
 
Human knowledge and human power meet in one, for where the cause is not 
known the effect cannot be produced.  Nature to be commanded must be obeyed; 
and that which in contemplation is as the cause is in operation as the rule. 
 
A connection between cause and action is also mentioned by Kant ([1781/7], 
A204/B249):  ‘Causality leads to the concept of action …’  However this remark is not 
followed up in any detail, and Kant’s overall position on causality obviously cannot be 
described as an agency or action-related theory. 
  It would be interesting to trace this earlier history in more detail, but, as I want to 
concentrate in this paper on the current issues, I will confine myself to discussing briefly 
one famous paper on causality, even though this does not present, or even mention, an 
action or agency approach.  The paper in question is Russell’s [1913] ‘On the Notion of 
Cause’.  This paper has a particular interest for me since I believed its conclusions for 
many years, and even though I now reject Russell’s overall position, I still think that 
some of his ideas are valid, and will attempt to incorporate these ideas in the view to be 
presented in what follows. 
 
 
2  Russell on Causality 
 
Russell begins his paper in a dramatic fashion by claiming the word ‘cause’ should be 
altogether banished from philosophy ([1913], p. 173): 
 
In the following paper I wish, first, to maintain that the word ‘cause’ is so 
inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete 
extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable, … 
 
Russell’s principal reason for this recommendation is that the word ‘cause’ has already 
disappeared from the advanced sciences.  As he says ([1913], p. 173): 
 
All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the 
fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced 
sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs. 
 
Russell, writing just before the First World War, concludes that causality, like the British 
monarchy, is something no longer appropriate in the modern age.  With his customary 
wit, he puts the point as follows ([1913], p. 173): 
 
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, 
is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is 
erroneously supposed to do no harm.  
 
  In these quotations Russell has perhaps rather exaggerated his own position in the 
interest of some striking turns of phrase.  If we read on, we discover that he does after all   3
allow a weak notion of causality.  However he claims that this notion of causality is 
useful only in everyday life and the infancy of science.  His main thesis, therefore, is that 
the concept of cause disappears from science as it advances. 
Regarding the weak notion of causality which he in fact allows, Russell gives an 
analysis similar to Hume’s ‘constant conjunction’ account, except that Russell claims that 
the sequences are of frequent rather than absolutely constant conjunction, and that they 
yield no more than probability ([1913], p. 185): 
 
… the sequence, in any hitherto unobserved instance, is no more than probable, 
whereas the relation of cause and effect was supposed to be necessary. … Thus in 
our present sense, A may be the cause of B even if there actually are cases where 
B does not follow A.  Striking a match will be the cause of its igniting, in spite of 
the fact that some matches are damp and fail to ignite. 
 
Thus causal laws for Russell are laws of probable sequence.  He points out one curious 
consequence of this neo-empiricist or neo-Humean account, namely that it turns out to be 
correct to say that night causes day ([1913], p. 185).  Intuitively however the statement 
that night causes day does not seem to be true. 
  In terms of the analysis of causal laws as laws of probable sequence, Russell is in 
a position to state his main thesis which he does as follows ([1913], p. 186): 
 
… such laws of probable sequence, though useful in daily life and in the infancy 
of science, tend to be displaced by quite different laws as soon as a science is 
successful.  The law of gravitation will illustrate what occurs in any advanced 
science.  In the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that can 
be called a cause and nothing than can be called an effect; there is merely a 
formula.  Certain differential equations can be found, which hold at every instant 
for every particle of the system, and which, given the configuration and velocities 
at one instant, or the configurations at two instants, render the configuration at any 
other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable.  That is to say, the 
configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations at 
two given instants.  This statement holds throughout physics, and not only in the 
special case of gravitation.  But there is nothing that could be properly called 
‘cause’ and nothing that could be properly called ‘effect’ in such a system. 
 
Russell’s position depends on distinguishing between different types of scientific law.  
Causal laws are those of the form:  ‘A causes B’.  However there are other types of 
scientific law.  Russell mentions functional laws relating variables, and laws expressed by 
differential equations.  He could have added probabilistic or statistical laws, such as the 
law that radioactive emissions follow a Poisson distribution.  Russell’s thesis is that 
causal laws are useful only in daily life and in the infancy of a science, and are not to be 
found in an advanced science. 
  I believed this thesis for many years, and I still think it is correct for theoretical 
physics. However Jon Williamson persuaded me that it cannot be true for all advanced 
sciences, since it is plainly false for medicine.  Considerations of causality arise at every 
step in medicine.  For example a doctor who carries out a medical diagnosis is attempting 
to ascertain the cause of a patient’s symptoms.  If the patient suffers from pains in the 
chest, it is most important to know whether these are caused by lung cancer, angina, a 
bacterial infection of the bronchi, or something else altogether.  The treatment given will   4
be quite different for different causes.  We see from this that the notion of cause and 
causal laws play a crucial role in medical practice. 
  The same applies to medical research, as can be illustrated by one of Pasteur’s 
famous medical discoveries (cf. Dupré [1994], pp. 330-40).  In June 1879, Pasteur 
collected pus from the boil of one of his assistants, and discovered that it contained a 
bacterium which was later named staphylococcus.  In February 1880 Pasteur took pus 
samples from deep in the bone of a little girl aged 12 being operated on for the bone 
disease osteomyelitis.  He discovered that the pus contained a bacterium of the same type.  
This led him to conclude that boils and osteomyelitis are both caused by the same 
bacterium.  This was a very significant discovery since it showed that a serious disease 
located deep in the tissues had the same cause as a superficial and generally slight illness.  
The result eliminated the difference between internal and external pathology.  Note that 
this most impressive discovery was the discovery of a causal law.  
  Discoveries in medicine are used for either the prevention or the cure of diseases.   
In the case of staphylococcal infections, preventative measures were relatively easy.  It 
was a matter of preventing the pathogenic bacterium entering the body through greater 
care about hygiene and antisepsis.  The discovery of a cure proved much harder.  It 
required finding a substance (an antibiotic) which would kill staphylococci in a patient’s 
body without harming the patients.  Fleming discovered penicillin in 1928, but it required 
a lot of development work both by him, and later by the Oxford team of Florey, Chain, 
and others before penicillin could become an effective antibiotic.  (For details see 
Macfarlane [1984], especially pp. 185-6.)  In fact it was not until May 1941 that the first 
patient was cured of a staphylococcal infection (a 4 inch carbuncle on the back) using 
penicillin.  Hence 62 years elapsed between the discovery of the cause of a group of 
illnesses, and the development of a successful cure.  However it is worth noting that the 
discovery of the cause was a precondition for developing a cure. 
Returning now to Russell, we can see that medicine completely refutes his claim 
that causal laws belong only to the infancy of science.  Medicine has been highly 
successful and produced cures which would have been regarded as miraculous in a 
former age.  Thus medicine has every claim to be an advanced science, and yet makes 
essential use of the notion of cause and of causal laws.  Russell, however, was correct in 
his claim that non-causal mathematical laws have replaced causal laws in theoretical 
physics. His mistake was to assume that the same applied to every advanced science.  
This is an instance of a saying of Wittgenstein’s ([1953], §593): 
 
A main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet:  one nourishes one’s 
thinking with only one kind of example. 
 
It also shows that one must study history and philosophy of science, and not philosophy 
of science without the history.  Only the history of science can provide the variety of 
examples needed for philosophy of science. 
  To sum up then:  Russell’s thesis appears to be true of some advanced sciences, 
e.g. theoretical physics, but false of others, e.g. medicine.  This situation poses the 
following question.  Why is it that some advanced sciences can dispense with the use of 
causal laws, whereas such laws continue to play a central role in other advanced 
sciences?  As we shall see later, it is a point in favour of the action-related theory of 
causality that it can provide a satisfactory answer to this question.  Let us now turn to a 
giving a preliminary exposition of this theory. 
   5
 
3  Preliminary Exposition of the Action-Related Theory 
 
The basic idea behind the action-related theory of causality is quite simple.  It is that 
causal laws are useful and appropriate in situations where there is a close link between 
the law and action based on the law.  The concept of cause has evolved in such a way that 
the transition between a causal law and carrying out actions based on that law is 
particularly easy and simple.  It must be stressed, however, that the actions to which 
causal laws are related are of two forms, which we will describe as (i)  productive, and 
(ii)  avoidance.  As we shall see, the introduction of avoidance actions is one of the main 
points where the present action-related theory differs from the agency theory of Menzies 
and Price. 
Let us take productive actions first. These arise when our law is that A causes B. 
Someone wants to produce the effect B and does so by instantiating the cause A. Suppose 
for example that a member of the Praetorian Guard wants to kill the Roman emperor.  He 
knows the causal law that a dagger in the heart causes death.  So on the next occasion that 
the emperor is inspecting his troops, he rushes forward and stabs him in the heart, thereby 
achieving his goal. 
Causal laws can, however, also be connected to an avoidance action.  This arises 
when the law is that A causes B, but now someone wants to avoid the effect B or prevent 
it from occurring.  One strategy which such a person might adopt would be to ensure that 
A does not occur.  Naturally this is not a completely fail-safe method of avoiding B, since 
there might be another cause A* say of B which produces B even though A does not 
occur.  Nonetheless such avoidance strategies based on causal laws are often effective. 
Another type of avoidance strategy is based on pre-empting A from producing its 
normal effect B.  Generally we say that A causes B when A produces B under normal 
circumstances, or ceteris paribus.  Pre-emption of A’s causing B is said to occur if we 
alter some of these ceteris paribus conditions to ensure that A does not have its usual 
effect.  Our earlier dagger example can be extended to give an instance of an avoidance 
strategy based on pre-emption.  It was in fact quite common in late 16
th and early 17
th 
century Europe for those in powerful positions to be stabbed by fanatical assassins.  To 
avoid such a fate, James VI of Scotland and I of England used to wear padded clothing.  
King James knew well the law that, ceteris paribus, daggers plunged into someone cause 
death or painful injury, and he was taking an avoidance action based on attempting to 
pre-empt the well-known effects of stabbings with a dagger.   
Avoidance actions are of great importance in medicine.  Thus, to take the Pasteur 
example of the previous section, if we want to avoid having boils, we must take care to 
avoid being infected by staphylococci.  If we have a boil, we should seek to eliminate it 
by taking an antibiotic which kills staphylococci. 
The action-related theory of causality explains the value of causal laws both in 
everyday life and in medicine.  Everyday life imposes on us the constant necessity for 
taking action, and so it is obviously convenient to cast our common-sense knowledge in a 
form which is closely linked to action, that is to say in the form of causal laws.  In 
medicine too a doctor has to try to cure his or her patients, and so is under an obligation 
to act.  Thus medical knowledge, even though it involves advanced scientific 
considerations going far beyond common sense, must still be cast in a form which is 
closely linked to action, that is to say in the form of causal laws. 
Turning now to the laws of theoretical physics, I do not of course want to deny 
that these too are linked to practical applications and actions.  Thus, Maxwell’s equations   6
can be used for making radio transmitters, or quantum mechanics for making nuclear 
weapons.  However the connection between the laws and the corresponding practical 
actions is much more remote in such cases than it is in everyday life or medicine.  In the 
examples from physics, long mathematical calculations are needed, approximations must 
be made, and, usually, additional empirical assumptions introduced, before a theoretical 
scheme such as Maxwell’s equations can be connected to a practical problem such as 
radio transmission.  As the link between theoretical knowledge and practical action is 
here not at all close, laws other than causal laws can make their appearance, and indeed 
prove more convenient than causal laws.  This constitutes a partial justification for 
Russell’s claim that as a science advances it abandons the use of causal laws, since this 
claim is in fact true of theoretical physics, even though it is false of medicine. 
The action-related theory of causality has, however, something more to say about 
the case of physics.  Suppose we start with very theoretical laws of physics such as 
Maxwell’s equations or Schrödinger’s equation, and then through mathematical 
calculations, the construction of more detailed models, etc. gradually move towards some 
practical application.  The action-related theory of causality suggests that, as we approach 
practical actions, the causal laws which were absent at the very theoretical level might 
well reappear.  This does indeed seem to be the case as is illustrated by the following 
simple example. 
Let us consider the ideal gas law PV = RT.  This is a law of functional form 
relating the three variables P = pressure, V = volume, and T  temperature.  The law is 
clearly not of causal form since we cannot say that any one of the variables, e.g. V, is a 
cause, and another, e.g. P, is an effect.  The variables are all on a par.  If, however, we 
apply the law to a particular concrete situation where a gas is being manipulated in some 
way, causal notions do reappear.  However what counts as a cause may differ in different 
applications.  
The law as we know holds approximately for some gases under certain conditions.  
Suppose we are handling such a gas under these conditions.  Let us first suppose (see 
figure 1) that this gas is in a cylinder one end of which is closed by a piston which can be 
moved in or out. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The apparatus is held at constant temperature.  It follows from the ideal gas law that if the 
piston is moved in, the pressure of the gas increases; whereas if it is moved out, the gas’s 
pressure decreases.  But now we can consider the change in volume as the cause and the 
change in pressure as the effect.  This is because, by means of the piston, we can 
manipulate the volume in order to produce changes in the pressure.  Since there is now a 
close positive connection between the law as applied in this specific case, and the 
corresponding action, causality has reappeared just as the action-related theory would 
suggest that it should.  
Let us contrast this with a different application of the ideal gas law.  Suppose our 
gas is now in a sealed container made of such a material that it can be regarded as having 
constant volume for the range of temperatures which occur.  Suppose this sealed 
container can be heated by a bunsen flame as shown in figure 2, or cooled by being 
placed in a refrigerator. 
   7
Figure 2 
 
It follows from the ideal gas law that if the temperature increases, the pressure of the gas 
will increase; whereas if the temperature is decreased, the gas’s pressure will decrease.  
Once again causality has reappeared in a specific case, but now it is the change in 
temperature rather than the change in volume which acts as the cause, since manipulating 
the temperature produces changes in the pressure.  
This simple example suggests a reason why, in the development of theoretical 
physics, it may have proved advantageous to replace causal laws with laws of other 
kinds.  A single functional law such as the ideal gas law yields different causal laws when 
applied in different situations.  This functional law thus in a sense summarises a number 
of different causal laws and thus produces greater economy than could have been 
achieved by the exclusive use of causal laws.  The advantage of non-causal laws may 
therefore be that they allow greater economy;  their disadvantage that they create a 
greater gap between the law and action based on the law.  This is a gap which may need 
to be filled by mathematical calculations, approximations, the construction of models, 
and the other devices mentioned above. 
 
 
4  Differences between the Action-Related Theory, and the Agency Theory of 
Menzies and Price 
 
 As already remarked, the action-related theory was developed from the agency theory 
expounded by Menzies and Price in a series of important papers (Price [1991], [1992] and 
Menzies and Price [1993]).  It is time now to compare the two theories explaining their 
differences and the points they have in common.  In this section I will discuss three points 
on which the two theories differ, while in the next section I will deal with the important 
aspect on which they agree, namely the explanation of causal asymmetry. 
In his [1991], Price devotes some space to arguing in favour of evidential decision 
theory and against causal decision theory.  He does so by considering the following 
medical example.  It has long been recognized that in many people susceptible to 
migraine, an attack tends to follow the consumption of chocolate.  It thus seemed that, as 
least for this class of people, eating chocolate caused migraine, so that to avoid migraine 
they would be well-advised to give up chocolate.  Recently, however, a new theory has 
been devised according to which eating chocolate is not after all a cause of migraine.  
Migraine is brought about by a physiological state, and this pre-migrainous state (or 
PMS) increases the desire for chocolate, thus producing the observed correlation between 
eating chocolate and the subsequent onset of a migraine attack. 
Let us suppose that this new theory is true.  There is then no point in a migraine 
sufferer refraining from eating chocolate, since this will have no influence on whether a 
migraine attack occurs or not.  At any rate this seems to be the conclusion of a causal 
decision theory, i.e. one which takes causes into account when making decisions.  If, 
however, our migraine sufferers rely on an evidential decision theory, i.e. one which 
bases decisions on the statistical evidence obtained directly from the data, then it would 
seem that they should continue to refrain from chocolate, since there is still a statistical 
correlation between eating chocolate and the onset of a migraine attack.  In this case, 
then, causal decision theory and evidential decision theory give different results, and, as   8
the recommendation of causal decision theory seems intuitively correct, this is an 
argument in its favour and against evidential decision theory. 
Despite this difficulty, Price attempts to defend evidential decision theory against 
causal decision theory, but I have to confess that I cannot see the point of so doing.  I 
would favour not just a causal decision theory, but what could be called a maximal 
decision theory in which any established scientific law of whatsoever type (causal or non-
causal) is taken into account in making a decision.  Indeed to ignore any established piece 
of scientific knowledge in making a decision would seem to be foolish.  So, for example, 
a group of scientific experts when deciding whether to fund a project for building a 
quantum computer might carry out elaborate calculations based on the laws of quantum 
mechanics in order to judge whether such a machine was really feasible.  No one would 
say surely that they were wrong to take quantum mechanics into account.  They would 
rather be wrong to ignore quantum mechanics.  In the same way a doctor would surely be 
wrong to ignore established causal laws regarding the onset of a migraine attack when 
giving dietary advice about how to control the condition.  Interestingly Menzies and Price 
in their joint paper state that Menzies, unlike Price, does support the need for causal 
decision theory ([1993], p. 190). 
Price’s support for evidential as opposed to causal decision theory may arise from a 
generally empiricist rather than realist outlook.  At all events, he seems to be sympathetic 
to the kind of neo-empiricist, neo-Humean probable sequence analysis of causality which, 
as we saw, was adopted by Russell.  It is not that Price himself adopts such an analysis.  
It is rather that he suggests (and this is a suggestion not a definite claim) that some kind 
of neo-Humean probable sequence analysis of causality may be viable if we add to it the 
notion of agency.  Thus he says ([1991], p. 158): 
 
… my suggestion is … that in order to rescue the promised rewards of the 
probabilistic approach to causality, we should avail ourselves of the idea, often felt to 
be independently appealing, that the notion of agency is crucial to an understanding 
of causality. 
 
The following passage makes a similar point and brings out its relation to Price’s critique 
of causal decision theory ([1991], p. 173): 
 
This means not only that there is no need for a distinctively causal decision 
theory, but also that we may characterize causal regularities as associative 
regularities that continue to hold from the free agent’s distinctive point of view. 
 
In contrast to Price, I favour a realist rather than empiricist point of view, and this 
leads naturally to a different kind of philosophical theory of causality.  An analogy with 
probability should make this clear.  Suppose we are trying to give a philosophical account 
of probability as it appears in scientific theories.  Those who favour an empiricist point of 
view will be led naturally to the frequency theory of probability which gives an 
empiricist/operationalist definition of probability in terms of observable frequency.  
Those who are more inclined to realism will prefer a propensity theory of probability in 
which probability is an undefined concept, characterised by a set of axioms, and 
connected only indirectly with observation. 
The situation is exactly the same regarding philosophical accounts of causality.  
Those like Price who have an empiricist outlook will favour trying to define cause in 
terms of sequences of observable events, together with, in his case, the notion of agency,   9
since, as he says ([1991], p. 173):  ‘Agency is something of which we all have direct 
experience.’  Those of a realist persuasion, however, will not attempt to define cause in 
terms of what can be directly experienced.  Cause will rather be regarded as an undefined 
sui generis notion, which is connected only indirectly with observation. 
I now come to the last, and perhaps key, difference between the agency theory 
and the action-related theory.  To see what this is, let us consider two general accounts of 
the agency theory of causality.  The first comes from Price ([1992]) where he is 
considering ‘the agency or manipulability theory of causation in general’, and writes (p. 
514): 
 
Roughly, to think of A as a cause of B is to think of A as a potential means for 
achieving (or making more likely) B as an end. 
 
The second comes from Menzies and Price ([1993], p. 189): 
 
… the common idea to agency accounts of causation is that an event A is a cause 
of a distinct event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A would be an 
effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B. 
 
These characterisations of agency theories of causality only mention what we have called 
productive actions based on a causal law, and not avoidance actions based on such a law.  
Yet avoidance actions are very important, particularly in medicine.  It is true that 
smoking causes lung cancer, but this does not mean that smoking is an effective means 
by which a free agent could give himself or herself lung cancer.  It is rather that 
refraining from smoking is a sensible strategy for trying to avoid getting lung cancer.  
The term ‘agency’ does indeed suggest the productive action, and this is why I have 
introduced the term ‘action-related’ which suggests that it is possible to base different 
types of action (both productive and avoidance) on causal laws. At all events a 
consideration of avoidance actions will, as we shall see in section 6, be most important 
for answering some objections to the action-related theory of causation. 
 
 
5  Explanation of Causal Asymmetry 
 
Having dealt with the differences between the agency theory and the action-related 
theory, I will now turn to the important feature they have in common, namely the 
explanation of causal asymmetry.  I will begin by expounding Price’s views on this 
question as given in his [1992], but my aim this time is not to criticise these views (with 
which I agree), but rather to add some additional points in their favour.  
 
Price begins his paper as follows ([1992], p. 501): 
 
Here are two features of causation that an adequate theory of causation might be 
expected to explain:  (i) the causal relation is asymmetric – if A is a cause of B then B 
is not a cause of A;  (ii) effects never (or almost never) occur before their causes.  
 
Price goes on to criticise Hume’s treatment of this matter.  According to Hume, A causes 
B if A and B are constantly conjoined and A occurs before B.  However Price objects that 
this makes the causal and temporal arrows related by definition instead of offering an   10
explanation of this relation.  Moreover the definition rules out backward causation which 
Price holds to be logically possible and perhaps even to occur in some cases.  In contrast 
to Hume’s account, the agency theory of causation, according to Price, does really offer a 
very satisfactory explanation of causal asymmetry.  As he says ([1992], p. 515):  
 
… the agency account of causation … has a significant and largely unrecognized 
advantage:  it is particularly well placed to explain the nature of causal 
asymmetry, and its prevailing orientation in time.  For it is able to say that the 
asymmetry of causation simply reflects (or better, perhaps, projects) that of the 
means-end relation.  Causes are potential means, on this view, and effects their 
potential ends.  The origins of causal asymmetry thus lie in our experience of 
doing one thing to achieve another;  in the fact that in the circumstances in which 
this is possible, we cannot reverse the order of things, bringing about the second 
state of affairs in order to achieve the first.  This gives us the causal arrow, the 
characteristic alignment of which with the temporal arrow then follows from the 
fact that it is normally impossible to achieve an earlier end by bringing about a 
later means. 
 
To this passage Price appends an interesting footnote (16) about backward causation 
([1992], p. 515): 
 
The status of backward causation then turns on the question as to whether there 
are or could be exceptions:  cases in which we could coherently act for past ends.  
Dummett (1964) has defended the conceptual possibility.  A number of writers 
(including myself, in my 1984) have suggested that quantum mechanics might 
provide some actual examples. 
 
Although backward causation is an intriguing possibility, we can be certain that it 
almost never occurs in practice, and so I will ignore it in the rest of the paper.  I will 
therefore assume the following principle: 
 
Human action cannot change the past.    (*) 
 
From  (*) and the action-related theory of causality, a second principle follows 
immediately, namely: 
 
‘A causes B’ cannot hold, if B occurs earlier in time than A.   (**)  
 
According to the action-related theory, if ‘A causes B’ holds, then we can either produce 
or avoid B by manipulating A.  If, however, B occurred earlier in time than A, such 
manipulations would involve altering the past, which, by (*) is not possible.  Hence (**) 
is true. 
 
  From (**) it follows in turn that if A causes B, then either B occurs later than A, 
or A and B are simultaneous.  Let us consider these two cases in turn.  If B is later than 
A, then it is immediate by (**) that B cannot cause A.  So the asymmetry of causation is 
established in this case.  The case in which A and B are simultaneous is more 
complicated, and requires more careful consideration. 
   11
  Kant mentions simultaneous causation, although it raises some difficulties for his 
views.  He writes ([1781/7], A202/B248): 
 
At this point a difficulty arises with which we must at once deal.  The principle of 
the causal connection among appearances is limited in our formula to their serial 
succession, whereas it applies also to their coexistence, when cause and effect are 
simultaneous.  For instance, a room is warm while the outer air is cool.  I look 
around for the cause, and find a heated stove.  Now the stove, as cause, is 
simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room.  Here there is no serial 
succession in time between cause and effect.  They are simultaneous … 
 
Simultaneous causation also raises a problem for Hume’s account of causation in addition 
to those mentioned by Price which we described earlier.  
Medicine affords many examples of simultaneous causation.  A tumour may be 
the cause of a patient’s pain, although tumour and pain occur simultaneously.  In such 
cases of simultaneous causation, we are no longer dealing with a situation in which one 
event causes another event, but with a situation in which two processes are involved, one 
of which causes the other.  Thus one process (the burning of fuel in the stove) causes 
another process (the temperature of the room remaining above that of the outside air).  In 
the medical case, we can suppose that the tumour and pain begin and develop together.  
The more the tumour grows, the worse the pain.  Although the causal relation now holds 
between processes which occur simultaneously, the asymmetry of causation still applies.  
The stove causes the elevated temperature of the room, but not vice versa.  The tumour 
causes the pain, but the pain does not cause the tumour.  Once again the action-related 
theory of causation explains this asymmetry.  If we want to heat the room, we can light 
the stove, but we cannot ensure that the stove is burning by altering the temperature of the 
room, assuming that we have only 18
th century technology at our disposal, and there are 
no thermostats and heating control systems.  Similarly it may be possible to eliminate the 
patient’s pain by manipulating the tumour, for example by excising it surgically.  
However it is clearly not possible to alter the tumour by acting upon the pain in some 
way. 
Thus the agency theory, and its generalisation the action-related theory of 
causation provide a simple and fully satisfactory explanation of causal asymmetry.  This 
is a very strong point, indeed perhaps the strongest point, in favour of these theories for 
no alternative view of causation seems to give an adequate explanation of causal 
asymmetry.  The case of simultaneous causation is particularly difficult to deal with on 
any other account.  There are, however, quite a number of objections to the action-related 
theory of causation.  I will consider and try to answer some of these objections in the next 
section of this paper.   
 
 
6  Objections to the Action-Related Theory 
 
The main objection to the action-related theory of causality concerns causal laws of the 
form A causes B, where the cause A cannot be either instantiated or prevented from 
occurring by human action, but, so to speak, arises spontaneously in the course of nature.  
In such cases we can neither produce the effect B by deliberately instantiating the cause 
A, nor prevent the effect B by preventing the cause A, from occurring.  It therefore looks 
as if the link between causal laws and actions based on them which is postulated by the   12
action-related theory is broken, and that therefore the action-related theory fails to apply 
in such cases.  This objection is made by Woodward as follows ([1999], pp.209-10): 
 
Another criticism lodged against traditional manipulability theories is that … they 
face great difficulties in explicating causal claims (e.g., ‘changes in the position of 
the moon cause changes in the tides on earth’) for which the relevant human 
manipulations are impossible. 
 
  I will return to this example of Woodward’s later on, but will begin by illustrating 
the problem with the simple case of investigating possible causes of the lawn being wet.  
Two possible cases are the following. 
 
    The sprinkler caused the lawn to become wet    (1) 
 
    Rain caused the lawn to become wet.     (2) 
 
Both seem to be perfectly legitimate instances of causation.  Yet while (1) fits the action-
related theory perfectly, (2) does not appear to do so at all.  We can turn on the sprinkler 
whenever we wish the lawn to become wet, and so base our action on a causal law 
linking the functioning of the sprinkler with the wetness of the lawn.  However we cannot 
turn the rain on or off, and so the link between a causal law connecting rain with the 
wetness of the lawn and corresponding actions seems to be broken. 
What can be done about such cases of unmanipulable causes?  In fact there are 
two strategies for dealing with them.  The first depends on using avoidance actions.  
Some such actions are based on pre-emption.  As we remarked earlier, most causal laws 
of the form ‘A causes B’ should really be written ‘A causes B under normal 
circumstances’.  Even if we cannot prevent the cause A from occurring, we can often 
alter the circumstances in order to pre-empt the cause A from having its usual effect B.  
This is an avoidance action based on the causal law.  In other cases, there is no way of 
pre-empting the cause A from producing B, but, even if B does occur, we can still avoid 
it.  This is another sort of avoidance action based on the causal law.  The second strategy 
for dealing with unmanipulable causes is to use Russell’s suggestion of eliminating 
causal laws in favour of other sorts of law such as functional laws.  This strategy works 
well for examples from physics and astronomy, where, as already remarked, Russell’s 
claim that causality can be eliminated is largely correct.  I will now illustrate these 
various strategies by considering a few examples. 
Let us start with the case of rain causing the grass to become wet.  Here it is a 
simple matter to pre-empt the cause so that it does not have its usual effect.  Thus when 
rain stops play in a cricket match, the groundsmen bring out the covers, so that the wicket 
remains dry, thus ensuring that play can be resumed as soon as the rain stops.   The 
earlier example of James I wearing padded suits to prevent the usual effects of dagger 
blows is similar. 
Unmanipulable causes cannot, however, always be pre-empted to prevent their 
usual effects.  For example earthquakes are caused by friction between continental plates, 
but this friction on the boundaries of continental plates cannot be pre-empted in any way 
to prevent earthquakes.  This causal law can, nonetheless, be used as the basis of 
avoidance action.  To take the simplest such action, those who are particularly keen to 
avoid earthquakes can refrain from going into areas on the boundary between continental 
plates.   13
 
  This strategy for dealing with unmanipulable causes depends on consideration of 
avoidance actions.  Now earlier I criticised the agency theory of Menzies and Price on the 
grounds that it considered only productive actions and not avoidance actions.  This 
criticism can now be reinforced by remarking that this restriction prevents them from 
giving a satisfactory account of unmanipulable causes.  Thus they deal with the 
earthquake case by saying that the causal law enables seismologists to simulate 
earthquakes by ([1993], p. 198) ‘their artificial simulations of the movement of 
continental plates.’  This does not seem to me a satisfactory solution to the problem.  The 
whole point of an agency or action-related theory of causality is to link causal laws with 
practical human actions in the real world.  Simulations are better considered as a 
theoretical preliminary to practical action rather than as part of such action. 
A consideration of avoidance actions also helps to deal with another class of 
unmanipulable causes, namely those giving the causes of events which happened in the 
past.  Consider the following example. 
 
The collision of the Earth with an asteroid or large meteor                    (H) 
caused the extinction of the dinosaurs. 
 
There is now a great deal of evidence for the historical statement H, and it is widely 
believed by palaeontologists.  Yet we cannot go back in time and prevent the collision of 
the Earth with the asteroid or large meteor, or alter its effect - the extinction of the 
dinosaurs.  These events occurred in the past and cannot now be changed.  How then can 
the causal statement H be related to human actions? 
My answer regarding this and similar examples is that historical statements 
involving causality such as H should be taken as particular instances of more general 
causal laws which could apply today as well as in the past.  Regarding our example H, the 
general causal law would be something like the following. 
 
  The collision of the Earth with an asteroid or large meteor                   (T) 
  would cause the extinction of a large percentage of the then 
  living species. 
  
In fact many of the scientific arguments which established H also established T because 
they exhibited mechanisms which linked the collision with the extinction of a large 
percentage of the living species of the time.  Now T is a law on which human action can 
certainly be based.  Indeed there is currently a project to keep a careful watch on the 
orbits of asteroids and large meteors to see if there is a risk of any such object colliding 
with the Earth.  If there were such a risk, the object could be broken up or deflected from 
its course by a suitable use of missiles, and so the human race might escape the fate of the 
dinosaurs.  My claim here is a particular instance of the maxim that the past can 
sometimes be a guide to the present.  The causes of a historical event might still operate 
in the present and might therefore form the basis of human action, even though the past 
cannot be changed. 
I now turn to the second strategy for dealing with unmanipulable causes, namely 
Russell’s suggestion of eliminating causal laws in favour of other sorts of law such as 
functional laws.  An example for which this treatment seems appropriate is the following:  
‘The change of seasons is caused by the movement of the Earth in its orbit round the 
Sun.’  This apparently causal law can easily be replaced by a functional law.  The seasons   14
depend on the angle of elevation (θ say) of the sun at mid-day, and on the direction of 
change dθ/dt of this angle.  A relatively simple functional law relates θ, dθ/dt to the 
position ϕ say of the Earth in its orbit round the Sun.  An example like ‘the background 
radiation in the universe was caused by the big bang’ can be dealt with in the same way, 
although the non-causal laws involved will obviously be more complicated.  Woodward’s 
example, quoted earlier, of changes in the position of the moon causing changes in the 
tides on earth could also be dealt with by this Russellian technique. 
It might still be objected that this way of dealing with counter-examples is hardly 
satisfactory since the laws claimed to be non-causal are perfectly causal according to the 
standard concept of cause.  However, this objection does not take into account the fact 
that the action-related theory of causality, like any other philosophical theory, provides an 
explication, in the sense of Carnap, of the concept with which it deals.  According to 
Carnap we start philosophising by considering a pre-formal concept or explicandum, and 
the aim is to replace this with an improved concept, the explicans.  Now it is indeed 
required that the explicans and explicandum overlap to a large extent, but still, because 
the explicans is a replacement, it is perfectly legitimate that there should be a few 
instances of the explicans which are not instances of the explicandum, and a few 
instances of the explicandum which are not instances of the explicans.  The standard 
example of the latter case being the scientific explication of the concept of fish which 
results in the whale ceasing to be a fish and becoming a mammal.  (This is what Lakatos 
called monster-barring.) 
As we saw, Russell’s neo-Humean explication of cause made it correct to say that 
night causes day, whereas according to the ordinary notion of cause, day follows night, 
but it is not caused by night.  The action-related theory of causality agrees with the 
ordinary notion of cause in this instance, but disagrees in the related example of night and 
day being caused by the rotation of the Earth.  According to the action-related theory, this 
latter example should no longer be considered as a genuine example of a causal law, and 
should be replaced by a functional law, as of course can easily be done. 
Thus the action-related theory of causality, being an explication, does to some 
extent alter the boundaries of the concept of cause.  Yet this alteration is in fact very 
small.  Nearly all standard uses of the concept of cause are closely related to actions of a 
productive or avoidance kind in exactly the way that the action-related theory prescribes. 
I turn lastly to a more general objection to the action-related theory of causality. It 
could be claimed that this theory is unacceptably anthropocentric.  In particular it looks as 
if the theory leads to the absurd conclusion that if there were no humans, and so no 
human actions, there would be no causes.  Yet surely friction between continental plates 
would continue to cause earthquakes even if there were no humans, and no doubt many 
dinosaurs suffered from pain caused by tumours. 
My answer to this difficulty falls into two parts.  I will first argue that the action-
related theory does not prevent causal laws being objective and potentially human 
independent.  However I will then qualify this by arguing that the action-related theory 
does give the concept of cause an anthropocentric aspect, and that this is desirable rather 
than harmful. 
The first line of argument runs as follows.  The natural world is to be considered 
as highly complicated and subject to many variations, while at the same time obeying 
quite a number of laws and regularities.  From this profusion of laws, humans, naturally 
enough, pick out those which are useful to them in carrying out actions either to achieve 
desirable goals or to avoid undesirable situations.  This is why there is, in particular, a   15
search for laws which are of causal form, and so can be related to human action in a 
simple and straightforward way.  These laws have the property of being closely linked to 
human action, but they hold objectively quite apart from this property.  Indeed if they did 
not hold objectively, they would not be useful as a basis of action.  This is why we can 
suppose that so many causal laws would continue to operate in the absence of humans. 
The point could be put in this way.  The fact that a causal law is a law of nature 
means that it holds objectively independently of humans.  Yet the fact that it has been 
picked out from the complexity of the natural world by humans as a causal law shows 
that it is closely related to human action.  This is why causal laws can at the same time be 
objective and potentially human independent, while having an anthropocentric aspect.  
 
   
7  Extension of the Theory to the Indeterminate Case 
 
Most of the examples of causal laws considered so far in this paper have used what could 
be called determinate causality, which can be explained as follows.  A causes B involves 
a determinate notion of causality if, ceteris paribus, the instantiation of A is always 
followed by B.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, causes were considered to be 
determinate.  A dagger in the heart causes death, because death always follows such a 
dagger blow.  Now, however, we are quite happy to say that smoking causes lung cancer, 
although the habit of smoking does not always result in lung cancer.  In fact less than 5% 
of smokers get lung cancer.  Thus we are dealing here with what could be called 
indeterminate causality. 
It is rather difficult to say when this notion of indeterminate causality arose.  
Kant, for example, writing at the end of the eighteenth century, regards causes as 
completely determinate, as is shown in the following passages from the Critique of Pure 
Reason ([1781/7], A144/B183): 
 
The schema of cause, and of the causality of a thing in general, is the real upon 
which, whenever posited, something else always follows. 
 
([1787], B5): 
 
… the very concept of a cause … manifestly contains the concept of a necessity 
of connection with an effect and of the strict universality of the rule, …  
 
Russell in his [1913] paper does say that causality is probabilistic rather than necessary, 
but he clearly regards this as something of an innovatory view.  Moreover his example 
(striking a match causes it to ignite) is not really an example of indeterminate causation.  
The law should be understood in the sense that striking a match causes it to ignite under 
normal circumstances.  These normal circumstances are never of course exactly 
specified, but they are meant to exclude cases such as the match being damp.  Although it 
is true, in the sense of indeterminate causation, that smoking causes lung cancer, we do 
not want to claim that smoking causes lung cancer under normal circumstances, since a 
very high percentage of perfectly normal smokers do not get lung cancer.  
My suspicion is that the notion of indeterminate causality actually arose with the 
development of medical epidemiology, so that familiar examples such as smoking causes 
lung cancer are in fact among the first examples of indeterminate causality in modern 
times.  However this is an historical conjecture which would need further investigation.    16
Developments in quantum mechanics may also have influenced the emergence of the 
concept of indeterminate causality in the twentieth century. 
As the action-related theory of causality expounded in this paper has been based 
largely on examples of determinate causality, the question naturally arises as to whether it 
can be extended to indeterminate causality.  Indeterminate causality is more complicated 
than determinate causality.  It involves networks of causes, and it also involves rather 
complicated relations between causality and probability.  Nonetheless I would say that 
the tools do exist for extending the action-related theory to indeterminate causality.  They 
consist principally of two notions developed by Pearl (see his [1988] and [2000]), namely 
(i) Bayesian networks and (ii) the do-calculus.   However, this rather technical extension 
of the theory would require a paper on its own, and so cannot be dealt with here.   
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